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1. A new Deal for Europe should be based on a better understanding of the 
origins and the historical “neoliberal” roots of the crisis.
2. Make a clear assessment of the European Single Market and its restrictive 
notion of solidarity. 
3. Re-evaluate the limitations that the European Treaties have imposed on 
fiscal policies and the subsequent pressure of economic adjustments on 
the labour market.
4. Fiscal austerity will not succeed in promoting growth and creating jobs.
5. Fiscal policy should be seen as having the function of ensuring high-levels 
of aggregate demand, and the EU budget should be increased to act as a 
counter-cyclical mechanism.
6. A common labour policy and a shift away from wage repression are 
indispensable for Europe.
7. Focusing only on financial regulation misses out how finance is related to 
the rest of the economy.
8. Debt relief and consolidation should be discussed as part of a progressive 
policy package.
9. Supranational fiscal and labour authorities are required for increasing 
coordination across Europe.
10. The Stability and Growth Pact and the Six Pack have to be reformed so that 
fiscal policies are not reduced to a tool for simply balancing the budget.
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INTRODUCTION
The crises (economic, financial, ecological, institutional and political) affecting the Eurozone have sparkled the debate on the need for a new deal on European economic and social policies. Words such as 
“responsibility”, “solidarity”, and “coordination” have entered the policy 
debate at European and national level among progressive political circles. 
To this end, it has been argued that the way out from the crises should 
combine budget consolidation and debt control with stronger growth, 
employment and social cohesion. In other words, fiscal responsibility 
should be combined with economic effectiveness and social fairness 
(Rasmussen and Schulz, 2010). 
However, whilst highlighting the need to shift away from an exclusive focus 
on public deficit and debt reduction, it is questionable that the current 
progressive policy proposals are setting the foundations for a different 
model of development, let alone representing a real paradox shift from 
the current austerity policies.
This paper argues that in order to provide a concrete and real economic 
alternative for Europe it is important to gain a better understanding of 
the causes of the crises and their historical roots which can be traced 
back to the beginning of the neoliberal counter-revolution of the 1970s. 
Indeed, too often economic and financial crises have only been seen as a 
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temporary displacement which requires emergency measures rather than 
being embedded in the structural development of the economic system.
The disregard of the systemic dimension of the crisis has limited the scope 
of alternative policy recommendations predominantly to “preventive” and 
“reactive” measures and has led to a neglect of those policies essential 
for building the institutional and economic foundations that would put 
Europe onto a different and more equitable developmental trajectory 
where solidarity (at least in terms of job creation and equitable growth) 
takes centre stage.  Indeed, so far the ongoing crises has often been seen 
as a ‘crass exception that makes extraordinary measures necessary, only 
to return to normal once the crisis seems to have evaporated’ (Arestis 
and Sawyer, 2010 :331). In other words, most of the political decisions 
and discussions have amounted to the perpetuation of business as usual 
(Harvey, 2010), which translated into support of the current institutional 
and capitalist settings.
This paper begins by presenting a critical review of the causes and origins 
of the economic crisis and recession with a particular angle on Europe. This 
will be followed by a discussion of alternative economic and institutional 
policy proposals which could put Europe on a more sustainable economic 
trajectory.
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THE NEOLIBERAL ROOTS OF THE CRISIS
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1345678910A new Deal for Europe should be based on a better understandingof the origins and the historical “neoliberal” roots of the crisis. 
The systemic crisis which is affecting the Eurozone and other parts of the world has its roots in the neoliberal shift that took place in the 1970s-1980s and should be seen as the culmination of a pattern of 
financial and economic crises that has become more frequent and deeper 
over the past 30 years (Bellofiore, 2012, Harvey, 2010).
During the 1970s developed countries drastically changed their policy 
priorities from a commitment to full employment and towards fighting 
price inflation and increasing labour market flexibility. At the turn of the 
1980s Keynesian policies and a strong role of the state in the economy 
were seen as the cause of the world’s problems, while the laissez-faire 
of the economic liberalism was seen as the solution (Petit, 2012). In the 
name of inflation controls countries were urged to check and reduce 
government expenditure (especially on welfare), so that budget deficits 
would not fuel inflation. Governments were also encouraged to give 
political independence to the central banks, so that they ‘could raise 
interest rates to high levels, if necessary against popular protests, which 
politicians would not be able to resist’ (Chang, 2010: 57).
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In Europe the neoliberal shift significantly influences the creation of the 
European single market. The original idea behind the single market, which 
was reflected in the debate around the Single European Act (1986), had 
as a core objective the creation of a market that could be organized fairly 
and to the benefits of most of their stakeholders (consumers, producers, 
and workers among others) (Petit, 2012). However, it soon became 
evident that what could be done under the heading of ‘common market’ 
differed strongly among members and this impeded the development of 
rules of both coordination and solidarity (at least in terms of growth and 
employment). The restrictive notion of Common Market deeply rooted in 
the EU agreement of Germany prevailed, reinforcing a neoliberal Anglo-
Saxon dynamic that made it clear that the market was strictly a rule of 
organisation1, providing itself the solidarity that mattered (Petit, 2012).
However, at its completion in the early 1990s the single market did not 
produce the expected results. During the 1980s and 1990s several gains 
secured in the post-war era were reversed and instability significantly 
increased as a result of the free-market neoliberal policies. Price stability 
policies were supposed to lead to an increase in investment, growth, 
equity and employment across the globe but empirical evidence shows a 
very different picture.
Make a clear assessment of the European Single Market and its 
restrictive notion of solidarity. 
During the neoliberal period the world economy grew much more slowly, compared to the period of 1960s and 1970s, not least because investment has fallen in most countries (Chang, 2010). Europe has 
been no exception to this trend. In West Europe and South Europe private 
investment as percentage of GDP declined from 24% in 1970 to 18% and 
17% respectively by end of the 1980s, in the UK investment decreased 
from 18.9% in 1970 to 14% of GDP over the same period (figure 1).  
1     Organisations are here defined as ‘entities that concentrate the operation of groups of 
people within narrowly defined common rules and purpose’ (Nissanke and Stein, 2003: 302)
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Figure 1 - Private investment as % of GDP, European blocs2, 1970 – 2012
Source: Alphametrics Co. Ltd
From the 1980s also the growth of average per capita income slowed down 
in many European areas. For instance, in South Europe average per capita 
income growth in the period 1970-1979 stood at around 5.6% whilst in the 
1980s it reduced to 4.3% and in the 1990s to around 2.3%. In West Europe 
it declined from approximately 7% (1970-1979) to 2.3 percent by the end 
of the 1990s. Similar trends were also experienced in the UK and North 
Europe (table 1). 
2     European blocs are defined as follows: West Europe: Austria, Belgium-Luxemburg, 
Switzerland, Germany, France and the Netherlands; South Europe: Spain, Greece, Italy, 
Portugal and Ireland; East Europe: Albania, Bulgarian, Former Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, 
Rumania, and former Yugoslavia; North Europe: Norway, Sweden Finland and Denmark. 
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Table 1 - Average Per Capita Income Growth, European Blocs, 1970 - 2009
North Europe South Europe West Europe UK
1970 – 1979 5.14 5.64 6.97 4.65
1980 – 1989 2.99 4.32 1.63 3.91
1990 – 1999 1.35 2.34 2.35 3.92
2000 – 2009 3.37 3.38 2.58 1.01
Source: adapted from Alphametrics Co. Ltd, calculations by the author
In several European countries inequality in household’s gross disposable 
income also rose significantly. For instance, in the UK inequality increased 
by ten percentage points on the Gini scale from 0.25 to 0.35 (Irvin et al., 
2009). In Germany the Gini coefficient increased from 0.25 in the mid-
1980s to 0.30 in the mid-2000s and in Italy it raised from 0.30 to 0.35 over 
the same period.3
The fall in investment and growth was also accompanied by cut backs 
in the welfare state and a decline in consumption as wage stagnated 
(Bellofiore, 2012). Indeed, the restrictive macroeconomic policies which 
aimed at putting inflation under control also had negative effects on 
wages, employment and job security. In many countries during the 1980s 
job insecurity increased due to the decline in employment rate compared 
to the 1970s (figure 2). From the 1990s to the period prior to the crisis for 
several parts of Europe employment levels recovered, but job insecurity 
still rose as a result of so called “greater job flexibility” and the cutbacks in 
the welfare state since the 1980s (Chang, 2010).
3      Source : OECD (2009)
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Figure 2 - Employment as % of working-age-population, European Blocs, 1970 - 2012
Source: Alphametrics Co. Ltd
At this stage the only way to boost aggregate demand in an environment 
where wages are repressed was to increase the borrowing opportunities 
of households. This was done through a process of financialisation which 
significantly changed the relationship between financial and real economy, 
and that ultimately led to the ongoing global financial and economic crisis 
(see e.g. Stockhammer, 2010, Orhangazi, 2011). 
Financialisation has led to a significant slowdown in physical capital 
accumulation (thus reducing investment in productive activities further) 
and to a significant increase in financial assets. In addition, as a result of 
this process, the relationship between firms in the real side of the economy 
and the financial side has become more entangled as non-financial firms 
have started extending consumer credit to their own customers, and got 
involved in increasingly complicated financial deals to support profitability 
(Orhangazi, 2011).
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3
Re-evaluate the limitations that the European Treaties have 
imposed on fiscal policies and the subsequent pressure of 
economic adjustment on the labour market.
The completion of the single market in 1992 coincided with a recession across Europe (figure 3) and with an increase in the speculative currency runs. These currency attacks, especially to the 
Italian Lira and the British Pound forced investors to stick to the stronger 
Deutsche Mark (Petit, 2012).
Figure 3 - Growth rate of Gross Domestic Product, European Blocs, 1971 - 2011
Source: Alphametrics Co. Ltd
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In this context the Maastricht Treaty, which set up the basic principles 
for a common currency, represented a defensive reaction forced to rely 
on the German conception of social markets, insisting on the role of 
coordination and monetary criteria without any reference to solidarity 
rules. This clearly paved the way for the austerity plans as the only 
possible answer to any external challenge. Indeed, all the treaties and 
pacts that followed (e.g. Stability and Growth Pact, ‘Six Pack’ among 
others) merely specified conditions for the implementation of the 
common currency by imposing strict rules of behavior with few, if any, 
rules of solidarity (Petit, 2012).
Fiscal policy and budget deficits were seen as impotent in affecting 
the level of economic activity as the effects on aggregate demand of 
increases in government expenditure or decreases in tax rates would be 
exactly offset by changes in private demand. Fiscal policy was seen as 
a tool to encourage profligacy and budget deficits which would lead to 
unsustainable public debt (Arestis and Sawyer, 2010). A clear example 
of this is the intention of the Stability and Growth Pact for individual 
countries to have a budget position in balance or small surplus over 
the business cycle subject to a completely arbitrary 3 percent of Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) limit in any year. It is also reflected in the 60 
percent ratio of debt to GDP imposed by the Stability and Growth Pact 
(Arestis and Sawyer, 2010).
The Stability and Growth Pact, alongside the Maastricht Treaty, created 
four rules for economic policies. The four rules are that the ECB was 
granted independence from political influence, the rule of non-bail-out 
of national government deficits was introduced, the monetary financing 
of government deficits was prohibited, and member states must avoid 
excessive deficits. These rules were created in the belief that they would 
facilitate the European Central Bank’s primary task of price stability 
(Arestis et al., 2001).
In addition another institutional arrangement set up in the 1990s in the 
EU is the complete separation between the monetary authorities and 
the fiscal authorities (in the shape of the national governments) and the 
absence of a European Treasury. Thus, there is not any significant fiscal 
policy operated at the European level. The size of the European budget 
is relatively small at less than 1-2% of combined EU member states’ GDP 
Winning for Real: 10 fundamental challenges
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in 1997 (Arestis et al., 2001), and still dominated by the needs of the 
Common Agricultural Policy (see e.g. Stetter, 2012).
In addition the EU budget must be balanced, and the interaction between 
this and the limited size of the budget means that there is no scope for 
active fiscal policy, and that the EU budget is too small to operate as 
an effective stabilizer. It cannot be used as a counter-cyclical instrument 
either (Arestis et al., 2001). Apart from its small “structural funds”, the 
budget cannot provide for significant transfers between rich and poor 
nations of the union (Irvin and Izurieta, 2011). The redistribution effect 
in the EU, in the forms of structural and cohesion funds, is estimated 
between 0.5% and 3% of the difference between national GDP per capita 
and the EU average (Arestis et al., 2001).
Furthermore, rules imposed by the EU which specify a fixed limit on 
government borrowing fail to recognize that it serves as a mechanism 
for distributing over the time the cost of adjustment to shocks for 
smoothing the tax burden associated with public investment. In addition, 
constraints on government borrowing reduce the flexibility of national 
governments’ fiscal policy and make fiscal coordination very difficult 
(Arestis et al., 2001).
Thus the monetary union, by way of its specific design, has removed 
three essential policy instruments from the domain of national policy 
making: exchange rate management, monetary policy and fiscal policy. 
The latter became effectively dependent on the performance of the 
external sector the financial behaviour of the private sector (Irvin and 
Izurieta, 2011). At the same time the severe constraints on fiscal policy 
forced the pressure of economic adjustments onto the labor market 
(Lapavitsas et al., 2010).
Indeed, labour has lost out to capital across the Eurozone as both labour 
and wage policies were intrinsically weakened by the institutional design 
of the monetary union (Irvin and Izurieta, 2011). ‘Guided by EU policies, 
Eurozone countries have entered a “race to the bottom” encouraging 
flexibility, wage restraint, and part-time work’ (Lapavitsas et al., 2010: 
1). This race to the bottom has been won by Germany who succeeded 
in maintaining unit labour costs (i.e. average cost of labour per unit of 
output) lower than many other European countries (figure 4). 
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Figure 4 - Unit Labour Costs, index year 2000, Selected European Countries, 2000 – 2010
Source: OECD Data
The ability of Germany to keep unit labour costs lower than other countries 
did not result from the operation of free market forces. Instead, since the 
mid-1990s Germany has pursued policies promoting cuts in unit labour 
costs. These policies, aimed at enhancing labour market “flexibility” led 
to greater licenses to revoke workers’ traditional rights and to downscale 
the labour codes that had safeguarded employees’ living standards (Laski 
and Podkaminer, 2012). At the same time, high employment and the 
prospect of production being ‘outsourced’ to low-wage countries helped 
reduce wage aspiration. Thus, these policies contributed to suppressing 
the growth or real wages, despite the steady rise in labour productivity 
(Laski and Podkaminer, 2012).
Thus, is spite of a poor performance in terms of growth and productivity 
gains, the German economy (and West Europe as a whole) had been able 
to keep down inflation as well as the nominal remuneration of labour 
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compared to the European peripheral countries. Although peripheral 
countries in Europe (e.g. South Europe) performed generally better in 
terms of growth (figure 3) their labour costs and inflation (figure 5) have 
remained higher than the core European countries. 
Figure 5 - Price Inflation, European Blocs, 1970 - 2012
Source: Alphametrics Co. Ltd
As a result of these institutional settings and economic policies the 
Eurozone has become an area of entrenched current account surpluses 
for West Europe, financed by current account deficits for the peripheral 
countries (figure 6).
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Figure 6 - Current Account as % of GDP, European Blocs, 1970 - 2012
Source: Alphametrics Co. Ltd
Confronted with a public debt crisis, increased budget deficits (figure 7) as 
a result of the ongoing global crisis, and increased level of unemployment, 
especially among the young (figure 8) peripheral countries have been 
asked to implement harsh fiscal austerity policies and to make their labour 
markets more flexible.
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Figure 7 - Net Government Net Lending as % of GPD, European Blocs, 1970 – 2012
Source: Alphametrics Co. Ltd
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Figure 8 - Unemployment rate less than 25 years, Selected European Countries, 1991 – 2011
However, austerity policies have not led to the promised recovery results. 
Six years on from the crisis it has now become evident that Europe needs 
to embark on a different developmental trajectory where equity, growth 
and job creation are at the fore. 
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PROGRESSIVE ECONOMIC AND INSTITUTIONAL 
POLICIES
PROGRESSIVE ECONOMIC AND 
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4 Fiscal austerity will not succeed in promoting growth and creating jobs.
F iscal austerity, which is intrinsically built in the various European treaties and pacts, is not achieving the expected results.  A serious reconsideration of the institutional foundations and economic policies in 
Europe is needed in order for the Eurozone to embark on a new development 
trajectory where job creation, equity and growth is achieved across all areas 
of Europe (solidarity).
The response of the mainstream economists and policy makers to the 
current negative trends in employment and growth across Europe, and in 
particular across the peripheral countries, is that appropriately paced fiscal 
consolidation (austerity) should go hand in hand with growth-enhancing 
policies (Buti and Padoan, 2012). The suggested growth-enhancing policies 
focus once again on the bottleneck problems that the labour market is 
causing on growth. 
To this end a series of initiatives promoting more labour market flexibility 
and wage adjustments, in particular for the peripheral countries (in terms 
of wage reductions), has been advocated as part of a structural reform 
package to achieve employment, growth and competitiveness whilst 
correcting current account deficits (European Commission, 2012). However, 
these policies fail to address the key institutional constraints imposed on 
fiscal policy and the impossibility to use this policy as a counter-cyclical 
tool to boost aggregate demand and as a transfer mechanism of resources 
between rich and poor nations of the Union, an important aspect of 
“solidarity”.
The theme “solidarity” has been embraced by more progressive policy makers 
who highlight the unequal commitment to fighting unemployment and 
social exclusion and the need for more effective crisis prevention and crisis 
management mechanisms. To this end progressives have been calling for 
stability mechanisms, urgent financial regulation (e.g. financial transaction 
tax), an economic policy agenda of budgetary consolidation and jobs, and a 
European Employment and Social Progress Pact (Rasmussen and Schulz, 2010).
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY
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These policy proposals move away from seeing labour supply-side 
bottlenecks as one of the core impediments to growth and job creation in 
Europe and also recognize, to a greater extent, the role that financialisation 
played in the current crisis. However, the majority of the policy proposals 
so far have been preventive and reactive rather than building the 
institutional foundation of a European system that is, on the whole, more 
developmental and equitable.
The dominant policy stance rests on a somehow narrow view of the causes 
and the origins of the ongoing global crisis and recession. This crisis, as all 
the previous crises of the neoliberal period, has been seen as a temporary 
and “unpredictable” phenomenon which requires extraordinary measures 
to then return to normal once the crisis has subdued.  However, the global 
crisis and recession was indeed “predicted”. In 2002 with reference to the 
United States, Godley and Izurieta argued that they (the US) ‘should now 
be prepared for one of the most severe and intractable recession of the 
post-World War II period, with no natural process of recovery in prospect 
unless a large and complex reorientation of policy occurs both here and in 
the rest of the world’(2002: 27).
The crisis has also revealed some of the fundamental institutional 
and economic policy flaws within the Eurozone and these need to be 
immediately addressed if the objective is to create a more cohesive Euro 
area where solidarity (at least in terms of job creation, growth and equity) 
takes centre stage. 
Fiscal policy should be seen as having the function of ensuring 
high-levels of aggregate demand and the EU budget should be 
increased to act as a counter-cyclical mechanism.
F iscal policy should be seen as having the fundamental function of ensuring high-levels of aggregate demand. This implies that until investment strongly recovers from its long term decline and 
households are able to spend without incurring high levels of debt, budget 
deficits will have to continue (Arestis and Sawyer, 2010).
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7
It follows, that a serious reconsideration of the role and size of the 
European budget has to be undertaken. The EU budget should be 
significantly increased in order to provide incentives for promoting 
investment and employment-focused growth policies, to act as a counter-
cyclical mechanism, and to redistribute funds from rich to poor nations 
in Europe. Indeed, already in 1977, the MacDougall Report on the Role 
of Public Finance in European Integration highlighted the importance of 
having a federal budget of at least 5-7% of GDP of members’ states in 
order for the monetary union to be viable (Commission of the European 
Communities, 1977).
A common labour policy and a shift away from wage repression 
are indispensable for Europe.
There is a need for a common labour policy and a shift away from the current system of wage repression (Irvin and Izurieta, 2011). A common labour policy and a progressive harmonization of labour 
rights and social protection could also lead to a reasonably egalitarian 
income distribution and to an end to the current and dysfunctional “wage 
flexibility” framework (Irvin and Izurieta, 2011, Petit, 2012).
Focusing only on financial regulation misses out how finance is 
related to the rest of the economy.
P rogressive policy makers have also been focusing their attention to the deregulation of finance and the importance of adopting new financial regulations. However, an exclusive focus on financial 
regulation miss out how finance is related to the rest of the economy, in 
many contradictory ways (Orhangazi, 2011). Therefore, it is important that 
changes in financial markets and the adoption of new financial regulation 
is also accompanied by a reconsideration of the organizational structures 
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in the firm (Stockhammer, 2004). In other words, ‘regulation of financial 
markets and the empowerment of growth interested groups within the 
firm should go hand in hand’ (Stockhammer, 2004: 739). 
Debt relief and consolidation should be discussed as part of a 
progressive policy package.
Furthermore, there is also a need to engage in a serious debate on the possibility to restructure and consolidate public debts (Bofinger et al., 2012) and provide some form of debt relief for countries with 
high levels of government debts. In many cases these debts increased as 
a result of the presence of significant current account imbalances and in 
order to support and bail-out financial institutions in crisis. Expansionary 
fiscal policies and growth alone might not be sufficient for South Europe 
to reduce debt significantly (McKinley and Cozzi, 2011).
Overall, economic policies and objectives need to be rearticulated so that 
Europe can move away from the constant obsession of price stability and 
concentrate much more on objectives such as full employment, equitable 
distribution of income and resources, sustained (and environmentally 
friendly) economic growth, and the creation of sufficient productive 
capacity through a process of re-industrialisation, among others.
Supranational fiscal and labour authorities are required for 
increasing coordination across Europe.
A ll of these objectives however call for institutional reforms that should enter into the agenda of European policy makers. Only through institutional reforms it will be possible to clearly redefine 
a set of economic policy objectives and bring Europe on a more equitable 
developmental trajectory where solidarity is at the core.
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Europe still lacks supranational fiscal and labour authorities. Institutional 
arrangements for collective wage determination are currently undertaken 
on a decentralized and fragmented basis and have led to dramatic 
disparities across countries. However there is a need for a centralized 
supranational authority that pushes forward a common labour policy and 
coordinates wage policies. In addition, active fiscal policy and an enlarged 
European budget also require the creation of a supranational institution 
such as an EU Treasury. This can lead to increased coordination among 
union members by setting up common behavioural rules (Petit, 2012).
In order to revert the decline of private investment and to increase 
solidarity across Europe (by means of transfers from rich to poor nations 
of the Union) the lending scope of the European Investment Bank (EIB) 
should also be widened in order to make meaningful contribution to 
growth (Griffith-Jones et al., 2012) and to ensure high rates of capital 
formation, appropriately located across the EU (Arestis et al., 2001).
The Stability and Growth Pact and the Six Pack have to be reformed 
so that fiscal policies are not reduced to a tool for simply balancing 
the budget.
F inally, the Stability and Growth Pact and the ‘six pack’ are also in need of modification. The arbitrary 3% fiscal deficit to GDP rule prevents the efficient operation of automatic stabilisers and the 
use of fiscal policies for counter-cyclical operation, let alone stimulating 
aggregate demand (Laski and Podkaminer, 2012). There is a need for a Full 
Employment, Growth and Stability Pact and in this pact fiscal policy should 
be an active ingredient in achieving high levels of aggregate demand 
required to sustain high levels of economic activity (Arestis et al., 2001). In 
other words, fiscal policies should not be reduced anymore to a tool which 
aims for some balanced budget.
SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY
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